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Can financing frictions be accurately measured? A large and growing body of literature aims 
to develop an adequate proxy to measure the degree of financing constraints a firm might face. 
Most studies in the field estimate investment-cash flow sensitivities (ICFS) defined as the 
investment response due to a change in cash flow. This metric should be larger for 
constrained firms because these firms have only limited access to external sources, and 
therefore should invest at the pace of their retained earnings (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 
1988, FHP88 from hereinafter). A large number of studies (Hoshi et al., 1991; Bond et al., 
2003; Bhagat et al., 2005; Rauh, 2006) confirm that the ICFS-metric is indeed higher for 
categories of firms more likely to suffer from market imperfections (small firms,  low 
dividend-paying firms, firms without debt and/or commercial paper ratings, etc.).  
However, a number of recent studies find contradicting empirical evidence and suggest that a 
significant ICFS might be driven by increased investment opportunities or by endogeneity-
bias in the underlying investment equation (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, KZ97 from 
hereinafter; Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Cleary, 1999). These studies usually emphasize that a 
significant ICFS might originate from a spurious cash flow effect arising from cash flow 
capturing investment opportunities rather than signalling financing frictions. Overall, there 
seems to be a growing disagreement in the literature with a number of very recent 
contributions that either support the performance of ICFS-metric (Guariglia and Carpenter, 
2008; Guariglia, 2008; Islam and Mozumdar, 2007; Agca and Mozumdar, 2008) or contradict 
the performance of the ICFS-metric in terms of capturing financing constraints (Erickson and 
Whited, 2000; Cummins et al., 2006; Lyandres, 2007; Wei and Zhang, 2008). 
As a response to this growing controversy, Almeida et al. (2004) and a number of subsequent 
studies such as Lin (2007), Khurana et al. (2006) and Han and Qiu (2007) suggest to focus on 2 
 
cash-cash flow sensitivities (CCFS) as a metric to capture financing constraints. This metric is 
defined as the change in the cash account due to change in cash flow and should be higher for 
constrained firms, since these firms should have the tendency to buffer cash in order to 
compensate for future fluctuations in net worth. Almeida et al. (2004) argue that the focus on 
a financial variable rather than on a real variable should make this metric less susceptible to 
debate in comparison to the ICFS-metric, because in the underlying cash-equation there is no 
need to control for unknown future investment opportunities. Indeed, this metric seems to 
avoid the whole discussion whether or not the ICFS-effect reflects a spurious investment 
opportunities-effect rather than signalling financing frictions.   
In the existing literature, both metrics seems to exist separately and which metric is being 
used seems to be dependent upon choice of the researcher. The aim of this paper is twofold. 
First, we argue that both metrics are fundamentally linked on the firm-level. This relation is 
embedded in the original two-period model of Almeida et al. (2004) and stems from the fact 
that both investments and the cash account can be considered alternative uses of funds 
competing for limited available cash flows. As a result a firm that displays a high ICFS over 
the observed sample period will necessarily display a low CCFS and vice versa, ceteris 
paribus. As far as we know this is the first study to analyze both theoretically and empirically 
the firm-level link between these two measures, currently considered separate measures to 
capture the same economic phenomenon. We believe that this negative relation between the 
two metrics is important given the continuous and growing disagreement on the ICFS-metric, 
and the recent shift in attention towards estimating the CCFS-metric to capture financing 
constraints. 3 
 
Secondly, we analyze both metrics in their ability to capture constraints by regressing the 
firm-specific sensitivities on a number of observables that have been shown to vary with the 
constraints-status of the firm. This approach is very much in line with the ex-post evaluative 
framework suggested in Hovakimian (2009), Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009) and 
D’Espallier et al. (2008). The results show that the firm-level ICFS is significantly related to a 
wide number of observable measures of financing constraints. For the firm-level CCFS, we 
find no relation with any of these observable measures of financing constraints, suggesting 
that the firm’s cash policy is a poor predictor of the firm’s constraints-status.  
This poor performance of the CCFS-metric alongside its negative relation with the ICFS-
metric seriously questions the recent shift in attention towards measuring cash-cash flow 
sensitivities in order to capture the firm’s financing constraints. This result is in line with the 
recent findings by Riddick and Whited (forthcoming) who argue that the firm’s cash policy is 
driven by income shocks and taxation issues rather than by the cost of external funds.    
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss some of the most recent 
literature on both metrics with specific attention to the disagreement on the ICFS-metric and 
the seeming benefits of the CCFS-metric in addressing these issues. In the second section, we 
revisit the theoretical model of Almeida et al. (2004) in order to derive the negative relation 
on the firm-level between ICFS and CCFS. Section 4 summarizes the main empirical findings 
based upon a large longitudinal sample of U.S.-based listed firms. Finally, in section 5 we 
conclude and discuss potential implications, limitations and suggestions for further research.    




I. Measuring financing constraints 
In their seminal paper, FHP88 investigate different cash flow-augmented investment models 
to estimate the ICFS as a proxy for financing constraints. The ICFS, which is the coefficient 
of cash flow in the underlying investment equation, measures the investment response due to 
a change in cash flow and is predicted to be higher for financially constrained firms. This 
metric is to a certain extent intuitively appealing because firms suffering from capital market 
imperfections depend mainly on their internal funds and therefore will invest at the pace of 
their retained earnings. Consequently, the investment rate of constrained firms will fluctuate 
with the availability of internally generated cash flows which leads to a large correspondence 
between cash flow and investment.   
Many studies provide empirical support for the FHP88-results by showing that the ICFS is 
higher for firms that have a high ‘susceptibility’ to capital market imperfections and vice 
versa. For instance, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Carpenter and Petersen (2002) find 
a higher ICFS for smaller firms, Hoshi et al. (1991) and Deloof (1998) find a lower ICFS for 
firms with a close bank-affiliation, Bond et al. (2003) and Islam and Mozumdar (2007) find a 
higher ICFS for firms operating in a competitive, market-based environment. Bhagat et al. 
(2005) find a higher ICFS for firms with fewer tangible assets. These studies seem to confirm 
that the ICFS is higher for firms more subject to capital market imperfections. 
On the other hand, a number of studies have found opposite empirical results. For instance, 
KZ97 analyze the subset of most financially constrained from the FHP88-sample, i.e. the ones 
with the lowest dividend-payout ratio, and find a lower ICFS for this group. Similarly, Cleary 
(1999) finds a lower ICFS for firms more subject to capital market imperfections using a 
constructed Z-score index, and Kadapakkam et al. (1998) finds a lower ICFS for smaller firms 5 
 
using a large international dataset covering 6 OECD countries. These studies have fuelled the 
debate and seriously challenge whether the ICFS can be considered an accurate proxy for 
financing constraints.  
As argued by Whited (1992), Gomes (2001), Alti (2003), Cummins et al. (2006) among 
others, one important caveat in the analysis that might explain the contradictory findings in 
the literature is that cash flow might convey information about the firm’s future investment 
opportunities. When this is the case, a significant ICFS-effect might be observed that reflects 
increased investment opportunities rather than signalling financing frictions. In other words, 
the observed relation between cash flow and investment might be a spurious effect resulting 
from the inability to control for investment opportunities in the underlying investment 
equation.  
Traditionally, the Q -investment paradigm is being used that adds a proxy for Tobin’s Q 
(usually proxied by the firm’s market value over book value) in the investment equation in 
order to control for investment opportunities. However, many studies emphasize that Q has 
often low explanatory power in the reduced-form investment equation and therefore might be 
a poor proxy for investment opportunities (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2001; Cooper and Ejarque, 2003; Bond et al., 2003). Therefore, some recent 
studies experiment with new and improved proxies for investment opportunities. For instance, 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) use a variable ‘Fundamental Q’ which is the expected value 
of Marginal Q estimated from a set of VAR forecasting equations. Erickson and Whited 
(2000) estimate Marginal Q directly using measurement error-consistent GMM estimates. 
Cummins et al. (2006) and Almeida and Campello (2007) use analyst’s forecasts as 6 
 
instruments for estimating Q. Finally, Guariglia and Carpenter (2008) use the amount of 
contracted capital expenditures as an improved proxy for investment opportunities.  
Despite these many efforts, there seems to be no agreement whether these improved proxies 
sufficiently control for investment opportunities in the underlying investment equation. For 
instance, while Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Guariglia and Carpenter (2008) and 
Guariglia (2008) report that a significant excess-sensitivity pertains after successfully 
controlling for investment opportunities, Erickson and Whited (2000), Bond and Cummins 
(2001) and Cummins et al. (2006) believe that the significant ICFS effect is still primarily 
driven by the measurement error in Q.  
The previous debate has incited many researchers to move away from estimating cash flow-
augmented investment equations and focus on cash flow-augmented cash models. In an 
important paper, Almeida et al. (2004) project that the cash response due to a change in cash 
flow (CCFS) might be an interesting proxy to assess the degree in capital market 
imperfections. They project that constrained firms should display a tendency to buffer cash in 
order to anticipate future fluctuations in cash flow. Since constrained firms cannot depend on 
external sources at all times, they use cash and marketable securities as a cushion against 
future cash flow fluctuations. Therefore, the firm’s cash response resulting from a change in 
cash flow i.e. cash-cash flow sensitivity might be a good proxy to measure the degree in 
capital market imperfections.  
The main benefit of this metric is that it analyzes a ‘financial’ variable (cash), rather than a 
‘real’ variable (investment), so that it cannot be argued that the results are driven by 
differences in investment opportunities. Almeida et al. (2004) find empirical support for this 
theoretical prediction by showing that the CCFS is significantly higher for groups of firms 7 
 
with a higher tendency for capital market imperfections (smaller firms, low dividend-paying 
firms, firms without debt and commercial paper ratings). A number of subsequent studies 
such as Khurana et al. (2006), Han and Qiu (2007) and Lin (2007) follow this view and find 
that the CCFS might be a good predictor for the firm’s constraints-status using different ex-
ante classification criteria. Along the same lines, Faulkender and Wang (2006) argue that an 
extra dollar of cash is more valuable to shareholders of financially constrained firms.       
 
II. The Almeida et al. (2004)-model revisited 
The previous discussion shows that there is substantial debate on the usefulness of the ICFS-
metric, even in the most recent literature. At the same time, some recent studies move away 
from estimating ICFS and choose to focus upon the CCFS-metric to measure the degree of 
capital market imperfections. Both strands of literature seem to develop separately and no 
studies of which we know have pointed out that there is a fundamental firm-level relation 
between both metrics. In this section, we argue that the ICFS and the CCFS are negatively 
linked on the firm-level using the two-period theoretical model by Almeida et al. (2004). 
 
A. Modelling Set-up 
Almeida et al. (2004) develop a two-period model in which there are three dates 0, 1 and 2. At 
date 0, the firm has ongoing operations that generate cash flow   . At date 1, these operations 
yield payoff   
  or   
  depending on the business conditions that are either high (H) or low (L) 
with probabilities p and 1-p, respectively. The firm can initiate a project    at date 0 that pays 
off       at date 2 and initiate a project    at date 1 that generates payoff       at date 2. Both 
production functions are concave and continuously differentiable. Investments can be 8 
 
liquidated at date 2 but only at a fraction of the original investment           . Therefore, 
total cash flows from both investment projects    and    can be written as                     
and                    . The firm can decide to transfer an amount of cash C from one 
period to another. Finally, the firm can extract external funds by pledging collateral up to a 
fraction of its total liquidation value which is given by  1        where   is a parameter that 
represents the risk-premium demanded by external investors. For high levels of  , the firm 
could become financially constrained because it is restricted from extracting external funds in 
the market.  
 
B. Value-maximization 
In this set-up each value-maximizing firm will maximize the sum of the discounted value of 
its future dividend stream subject to a number of budget and financial constraints as follows: 
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Equation (1) expresses the value of the firm as the present value of the future dividend stream 
which needs to be maximized, where d0,  d1 and d2 are dividends in periods 0, 1 and 2, 
respectively.  Equations (2), (3) and (4) model the dividends at date 0, 1 and 2 in different 
states S that can either be low (L) or high (H). The terms   and   are borrowing amounts that 
are issued at dates 0 and 1, respectively and need to be repaid at date 2. Equations (5) and (6) 
reflect the borrowing amounts that can never be higher than the collateral value of new 
investments. Finally, equation (7) reflects a hedging-identity which signifies that the firm can 
perform a hedging operation in order to hedge against insecurity of the state S (either H or L) 
by taking an opposite position on for instance the futures market. The identity states that 
combined payoff from both spot and futures markets on the hedging amount h should equal 
zero.  
Almeida et al. (2004) show that in case of financing frictions, the firm cannot undertake its 
first-best investment level and borrowing capacity will be exhausted at dates 0 and 1. 
Additionally, no dividends will be paid at dates 0 and 1. Using these facts, the firm’s 
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Writing the first-order condition and solving for C, the optimal cash policy C* is determined 
by: 
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Equation (9) represents that in equilibrium the firm’s marginal costs of holding cash will be 
offset exactly by the firm’s marginal benefits of holding cash. The left-hand side represents 
the marginal cost of holding cash that originates from sacrificing current valuable investment 
projects at the expense of a higher cash transfer to the next period. The right-hand side of the 
equation represents the marginal benefit of holding cash that originates from the firm’s ability 
to relax the borrowing constraint in the future by its increased cash holdings. In equilibrium 
the marginal cost of an additional dollar cash transfer will be offset exactly by the marginal 
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where the right-hand side is the marginal benefit of holding cash defined as the change in 
firm-value due to a change in cash, and the left-hand side is the marginal cost of holding cash 
defined as the change in costs due to a change in cash.    
 
C. Implications for optimal investment and cash policy 
Almeida et al. (2004) state that the main implication from their model is that the constrained 
firm has a clear incentive to transfer an optimal amount of cash C* from one period to the 
next, thereby creating a propensity to save cash out of its cash flows. Put differently, each 
firm will balance marginal costs of holding cash with marginal benefits of holding cash so 
that an optimal amount of cash will be transferred into the next period. As a result, the 11 
 
constrained firm will display positive cash-cash flow sensitivity, whereas for the 
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While we fully agree with these implications, we believe that this is only part of the story. 
The magnitude of the optimal amount of cash C* fully depends upon the firm’s current 
investment opportunities. When the firm’s current investment opportunities are low, the 
marginal cost of holding cash (originating from sacrificing current opportunities) will also be 
low and the marginal benefit of holding cash (originating from relaxing potential future 
constraints) will be high. As a result, a larger amount of cash will be transferred into the next 
period so that C* is high. Adversely, when the firm’s current investment opportunities are 
high, the marginal cost of holding cash will also be high and the marginal benefit of holding 
cash will be low. Consequently, a smaller amount of cash will be transferred into the next 
period so that C* is low.  
In other words, the marginal cost of holding cash and the marginal benefit of holding cash are 
a direct function of the firm’s current investment opportunities which has a direct influence on 
the optimal amount of cash C* that will be transferred into the next period. This can be 
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Put differently, although the model predicts the existence of an optimal amount of cash C* 
that gives rise to a significant CCFS, the model is unable to predict the magnitude of the 
amount C*, which clearly depends upon the level of current investment opportunities. Low 
current investment opportunities indicate a low marginal cost of holding cash which leads to a 
larger amount of C* being transferred into the next period. High current investment 
opportunities indicate a higher marginal cost of holding cash which leads to a lower amount 
of C* being transferred.  
Furthermore, the existence of an optimal amount of cash C* leads to an optimal amount of 
investment I* inversely proportional to C*, because the firm’s cash account and investments 
are two opposite uses of funds, competing for the firm’s limited available cash flow, holding 
constant other uses of funds (such as dividends, perks etc.
1). A firm that transfers a high 
amount of cash C* into the next period, will have fewer funds at its disposal for direct 
investment which leads to a lower I*. Vice versa, a firm that transfers a low amount of cash 
C* into the next period, will have more funds available for investment I*, ceteris paribus.    
                                                 
1 The major other use of funds besides cash and investments is dividends, but dividends are often fixed over time, 
because shareholders prefer a steady dividend-flow. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that the 
investments and the cash account are two major uses of funds holding competing for limited available cash flows.     
 13 
 
This means that the Almeida et al. (2004)-model does not only predict an optimal amount of 
cash C*, indicating a significant CCFS, but also predicts an optimal amount of investment I*, 
which might lead to a significant ICFS, depending upon the current investment opportunities. 
At each date, a firm will balance investments and cash, depending on their marginal 
contribution to the future dividend stream. Firms with many valuable investment 
opportunities today, have no reasons to postpone current investment opportunities at the 
benefit of increased cash transfer and will put their limited cash flows in investments. These 
firms will operate under a high ICFS at the expense of less cash transfer to the next period i.e. 
a lower CCFS. On the other hand, firms with few valuable current investment opportunities 
today, will have a greater incentive to buffer cash. These firms will operate under a high 
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Note that the model does not prevent a firm from having both positive ICFS and CCFS over 
the observed sample period since investment opportunities are likely to change over time. It is 
perfectly possible that the firm will put most of its cash flows on investments when current 
investment opportunities are high, and decides to put its cash flow on the cash accounts when 
investment opportunities decrease. Therefore, it is possible that a firm exhibits both positive 14 
 
ICFS and positive CCFS over the observed sample period. However, the level of ICFS and 
the level of CCFS will generally be inversely proportional since cash and investments are 
competing uses of funds. Therefore, a firm that puts most of its cash flow on the cash account 
will have fewer funds available to invest and vice versa. In other words, over the observed 
sample period, a firm will have either put most of its cash flow on investments (at the expense 
of fewer funds for the cash account) or either on the cash account (at the expense of fewer 
funds for direct investments). In conclusion, we expect a negative relation between the firm’s 
CCFS and the firm’s ICFS which is the main proposition to be tested in this paper.  
 
III. Empirical Results 
The previous discussion shows that the negative relation between the firm’s ICFS and CCFS 
is embedded in the original two-period theoretical framework developed in Almeida et al. 
(2004) and originates from the fact that investments and the cash account are two rival uses of 
funds, competing for the firm’s limited available cash flows. In this section we test this 
assertion empirically using a large longitudinal dataset of 1,233 U.S.-based listed 
manufacturing firms.        
 
A. Data and Sample Descriptives 
Annual financial data were extracted from COMPUSTAT for U.S.-based listed firms over a 
five-year time period from 2000-2004 (included). Firms belonging to regulated and financial 
industries according to their two-digit SIC-code (43XX, 48XX, 49XX, 6XXX, 9XXX) were 
excluded from the sample. An additional requirement for firms to enter the sample is that they 
do not report negative values for market-to-book,  total assets or  capital stock during the 15 
 
sample-period. Negative cash flow observations were excluded from the sample so that we 
remove firms that are in financial distress rather than facing financing frictions
2. Investments 
are truncated at zero which is the standard approach in the literature.  
To remove outliers, the upper and lower 1% of observations was deleted for all variables in 
the dataset
3. Additionally, each variable that enters the regression equation has been 
‘winsorized’ if its value exceeds a pre-specified cut-off value. Cut-offs were chosen in such a 
way that values beyond these points can reasonably be considered outliers
4. These procedures 
lead to a large unbalanced data-set of 1,233 firms over 5 years which means 6,165 firm-year 
observations.  
Table I presents summary statistics for a selection of financial variables for the sample under 
study. As can be seen, the median firm has around 0.48 billion dollars in total assets and has 
annual sales around 0.51 billion dollars. The investment rate for the median observation is 
around 10% and cash flow is around 21% of capital stock. The median value for Tobin’s Q is 
1.94, which means that the stock market values the median firm almost twice as high as the 
firm’s book-value. Most of the firms do not pay out dividends as can be seen from the median 
dividend ratio of 0.00. In fact, only in 47% of the observations a positive dividend has been 
paid out with an average value of 5.2% of the capital stock. The median tangibility ratio is 
0.56 which means that half of the fixed assets are tangible assets for the median firm. Most 
firms have a rather healthy cash position as can be seen from the cash ratio with a median 
value of 0.11, slack ratio with a median value of 0.51 and the current ratio, which is 2.03 for 
                                                 
2 This is in line with Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) and Islam and Mozumdar (2007) who emphasize a 
distortionary effect of negative cash flow observations.  
3 Removal of the upper and lower percentile is standard procedure in the literature on financing constraints 
(Bhagat et al., 2005).  
4  Following cut-offs have been used:     ⁄   ,     2 . 0 ;    ,     1 0 . 0 ;       ⁄   ,     5 . 0. These cut-offs are 
sufficiently wide so that values beyond the cut-off points can reasonably be considered outliers.  16 
 
the median firm. Sales growth was around 9% for the median firm. Coverage ratio for the 
median firm is around 4.62 which means that EBIT is roughly five times as high as the 
interest payments. Sales growth is 9% for the median firm and return on equity is around 10%. 
 
< Insert Table I around here > 
 
B. Firm-level sensitivities and their negative relation 
As mentioned earlier, the ICFS is estimated by analyzing cash flow-augmented investment 
models. We use the augmented static Q model of investment with firm- and time-fixed effects. 
This specification is frequently used in the literature (for instance KZ97; Cleary, 1999; 
Alayannis and Mozumdar, 2004; Cleary, 2006; Islam and Mozumdar, 2007; among others) 
and can be written as:  
 
    ⁄   ,                 ⁄   ,        ,                ,       ( 1 7 )  
   
where (I/K)i,t is the investment rate, (CF/K)i,t  is the cash flow rate, Qi,t  is Tobin’s Q and firm-
fixed effects (δi) and time-fixed effects (ηt) are added to capture all firm-specific and time-
specific heterogeneity not accounted for in the model. In this specification β is the ICFS that 
measures the investment response due to a change in cash flow.   17 
 
The CCFS is measured by analyzing cash flow-augmented cash models. We use the 
specification developed in the Almeida et al. (2004)
5 which regresses the change in cash on 
cash flow and a number of control variables as in: 
 
∆  /   ,             /   ,                 ,                ,     (18) 
 
where (∆CH/TA)i,t is the change in cash and marketable securities and (CF/K)i,t  is again the 
cash flow rate. In this specification, the natural logarithm of total assets is added to control for 
arguments of economies of scale in cash management. Qi,t is added because the firm’s cash 
policy should be influenced by the attractiveness of future investment opportunities and 
Tobin’s Q is believed to capture unobservable observation about the value of the long-term 
growth options available to the firm. Again δi and ηt represent time and firm-specific effects. 
The coefficient β is the CCFS that measures the cash response due to a change in cash flow.   
In order to test the firm-level relation between the ICFS and the CCFS we estimate the models 
(17) and (18) using a varying coefficients model so that average coefficient for cash flow β is 
replaced by a firm-varying coefficient βi. Consequently, the cash flow-augmented investment 
model and the cash flow-augmented cash model can be written respectively as:    
 
    ⁄   ,           ,       ⁄   ,        ,                ,       ( 1 9 )  
∆  /   ,           ,    /    ,                 ,                ,     (20) 
                                                 
5 This specification is in fact the baseline-specification tested in Almeida et al. (2004). They also report an 
extended specification is also used that takes up a number of additional controls such as the change in net 
working capital, the change in short-term debt and the level of investment. For reasons of comparison with the 
ICFS-metric we use the baseline specification throughout this paper. However, the results have been checked for 
the augmented specification which usually yields similar results.     18 
 
where β1,i  is the firm-specific ICFS and CCFS, respectively. Varying coefficients model that 
involve heterogeneous slopes within a panel data context cannot be estimated using traditional 
estimation techniques such as fixed effects or random effects-estimation. Therefore, the 
Generalized Maximum Entropy estimator (GME) developed in Golan et al. (1996) will be 
used which is a non-parametric Bayesian estimation technique. Details about this estimation 
procedure can be found in a short appendix to this paper
6.  
In Table II we report descriptives of the 1,233 firm-varying ICFS-estimates and CCFS-
estimates in Panel A and B, respectively, and plot the kernel-density of the distribution of 
firm-specific sensitivities. As can be seen from Panel A, the mean ICFS is 0.30 which comes 
from a wide dispersion of firm-specific ICFS ranging between -0.34 and 1.10. The vast 
majority of the firms (97.8%) have an ICFS between 0 and 0.5 which are values very similar 
to what is usually found in previous literature. Only 0.5% of the firms have a negative ICFS 
which means that the firm has consistently invested despite negative cash flows or de-vested 
despite positive cash flows throughout the sample period. Around 0.8% of the firms have an 
ICFS greater than 1, which means that a 1% cash flow shock is associated with an investment 
response larger than 1%.        
As can be seen from Panel B, the mean CCFS is 0.11 which is of similar magnitude than what 
is found in most studies that estimate values of CCFS. Again, this mean value comes from a 
wide dispersion of firm-varying CCFS ranging between -0.57 and 1.64. A value larger than 1 
means that a 1% cash flow shock is associated with a larger than 1% shock in the cash 
account. As can be seen, only 0.08% of the firms have a cash response greater than 1. A 
                                                 
6 An application of the GME-estimator to the literature on investment-cash flow sensitivities can be found in 
D’Espallier et al., (2008) and Cleary and D’Espallier (2007).  19 
 
negative CCFS means that the firm has consistently drawn down on its cash reserves despite 
positive cash flows or has consistently increased its cash reserves despite negative cash flows. 
Around 8% of the firms display a negative CCFS. The table indicates that the vast majority of 
the firms (97.8%) have a CCFS between 0 and 0.50 which is a reasonable interval in terms of 
economic interpretation. 
 
< Insert Table II around here > 
 
In Table III we analyze the relation between the firm’s ICFS and CCFS by reporting a number 
of summary statistics for the CCFS in discrete sub-samples with different ICFS-values. The 
classes correspond to the 4 quartiles in the ICFS-distribution from ‘very low ICFS’ (ICFS< 
25
th percentile) to ‘low ICFS (25
th percentile < ICFS < 50
th percentile), etc. As can be seen, 
the mean CCFS is highest in the ‘very low ICFS’-class (0.127) and lowest in the ‘very high 
ICFS-class (0.07). In Panel B, we report the Pearson’s correlation coefficient and two non-
parametric correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rank correlation and Kendall’s tau). All 
coefficients indicate a negative correlation between the ICFS and CCFS. Moreover, the 
negative correlation is always statistically significant at the 1% significance level. These 
results are a first univariate indication that firms who operate under a high ICFS seem to 
operate under a low CCFS and vice versa, which confirms the negative relation that was 
derived from the Almeida et al. (2004)-model.      
  
< Insert Table III around here > 
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C. Evaluating ICFS and CCFS 
We analyze which metric performs best in terms of capturing financing constraints by 
regressing the firm-specific sensitivities (both ICFS and CCFS) on a number of observables 
related to the firm’s constraints-status. This regression analysis reveals how much of firm-
level variation in sensitivity is actually caused by financing frictions and therefore provides an 
evaluative framework for both metrics. As has been mentioned by D’Espallier et al. (2008), 
Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009) and Hovakimian (2009), an ex-post evaluative 
framework based upon firm-specific estimation provides a number of important benefits over 
the traditional empirical framework in which a sample-level (average) sensitivity is estimated 
for discrete sub-samples. First, the analysis avoids the practice of ex-ante classification in 
which firms are classified beforehand according to a single criterion that reflects a different 
‘susceptibility’ to capital market imperfections (i.e. size,  dividend payout,  debt and/or 
commercial paper ratings, tangibility, etc.). As noted by a number of authors, it is unclear 
whether a single classification scheme is able to distinguish between firms that reflect a 
different degree of financing constraints
7 (see for instance Schiantarelli, 1995, Almeida and 
Campello, 2008; Hovakimian and Hovakimian, 2009). Secondly, the analysis avoids working 
with sample-level or aggregate estimates that might be biased due to endogeneity of the cash 
flow variable in the investment equation, which is also a widely known problem in estimating 
the parameters of the investment equation. (see for instance Bond et al., 2003, Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002; Erickson and Whited, 2000, Riddick and Whited, forthcoming).  
                                                 
7 For instance, Almeida et al., (2004) find that there is a somewhat positive but far from perfect correlation 
between the different classification schemes.   21 
 
For the observable measures of financing constraints we use a wide selection of financial 
variables that have a clear relation with the constraints-status of the firm and a long-standing 
tradition in the literature. A large literature projects that financially constrained firms usually 
pay fewer dividends (FHP88 among others), are smaller (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002, inter 
alia.), have less cash (KZ97 inter alia), have higher debt positions (Moyen, 2004; Whited and 
Wu, 2006), have lower growth and lower profitability ratios (KZ97, Cleary, 1999). Therefore 
we expect a negative relation between the ICFS/CCFS and the dividend payout ratio, (natural 
logarithm of)  total assets,  sales,  cash ratio,  sales growth,  interest coverage,  ROE and a 
positive relation with leverage in the ex-post regression analysis. In Table IV we summarize 
the observable measures of financing constraints that were used as well as their expected 
signs in the ex-post regression.  
  
< Insert Table IV around here > 
 
In Table V we report the results from the ex-post regression analysis for the ICFS-metric and 
the CCFS-metric in Panel A and B, respectively. As can be seen from Panel A, the firm-level 
ICFS is significantly negatively related with the dividend payout ratio, total assets, sales, 
cash ratio, sales growth, ROE and interest coverage and positively related with the debt ratio. 
This suggests that a high ICFS is associated with fewer dividends, smaller firms (both in 
terms of total assets and sales), less profitable firms (both in terms of ROE and interest 
coverage), firms with less liquidity (both in terms of cash ratio and cash flow rate), firms with 
smaller growth performance and firms with higher leverage, indicating a positive link 
between the ICFS and the existence of financing constraints.  22 
 
All variables have coefficients in line with our expectations presented in Table IV and most 
coefficients (sales growth is the exception) are significant at the 1% significance level. 
Moreover, the F-statistics indicates joint significance of the models at the 1% significance 
level and the R² adjusted indicates that a significant proportion of variation is explained by the 
observable measures of financing constraints. The finding seem to hold regardless of whether 
size is measured by total assets or sales, whether profitability is measured by ROE or interest 
coverage and whether the firm’s liquidity position is measured by the cash ratio or the cash 
flow rate as can be seen from the different columns in the table. There seems to be a persistent 
relation between the ICFS and the observables related to the constraints-status of the firm. 
When the CCFS is added as an extra dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) the regression 
returns a statistically significant negative coefficient, which provides a multivariate check for 
the negative relation between ICFS and CCFS.  
Looking at Panel B, a totally different picture emerges from the analysis. We observe no 
significant relation between the CCFS and any of the observable measures of financing 
constraints. A higher CCFS is seems unrelated to the dividend policy, firm size, firm growth, 
liquidity position and profitability position. None of the observable measures show the 
expected signs that were reported in Table IV. This suggests that there is a much weaker link 
between the firm’s CCFS and its constraints-status. Only the intercept is always statistically 
significant with a value of around 0.14 indicating that the observed change in cash policy is 
not given in by the firm’s liquidity position, debt position or profitability position but rather 
another exogenous unobserved variable. Moreover, the R² adjusted is considerably lower 
(around 6%) than in the ICFS-regression and the F-statistics usually suggest joint 
insignificance of the models. When ICFS is added as an extra dependent variable in columns 23 
 
(5) and (6) we see again the significant negative coefficient, confirming the negative relation 
between ICFS and CCFS.  
Overall, the ex-post regression indicates a tight and consistent link between the ICFS and the 
firm’s constraints-status according to ex-post evaluation of the firm-varying sensitivities, 
whereas there seems to be no link between the CCFS and the firm’s constraints-status. This 
finding in combination with the firm-level negative relation between the CCFS and ICFS 
seriously calls into question the recent development of estimating cash-cash flow sensitivities.  
  
< Insert Table V around here > 
  
IV. Conclusions 
In this paper we predict and find empirical support for a negative relation between the firm’s 
investment-cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) and the firm’s cash-cash flow sensitivity (CCFS). As 
far as we know this is the first study to analyze both theoretically and empirically the link 
between these metrics, currently considered two separate and competing measures to assess 
the constraints-status of the firm.  
This negative firm-level relation, which is embedded in the original theoretical model by 
Almeida et al. (2004) stems from the fact that both investments and the cash-account can be 
considered two rival uses of funds competing for the firm’s limited available cash flows. 
Consequently, the firm’s optimal amount of cash that will be transferred into the next period 
is inversely related to the optimal amount of investment that will be spent, both amounts 
depending upon the status of the current existing investment opportunities. As a result, a firm 
operating under a high ICFS over the observed sample period, will necessarily operate under 24 
 
a low CCFS and vice versa, holding constant all other uses of funds, leading to a negative 
firm-level relation between the two metrics.  
We test the assertion empirically using a longitudinal dataset of 1,233 U.S.-based listed firms 
over a 5-year sample period and find substantial empirical support for the predicted relation. 
Additionally, we analyze the performance of the ICFS and CCFS-metric in terms of capturing 
financing constraints by regressing the ICFS and CCFS on a number of observables identified 
to have a clear relation with the firm’s constraints-status (Whited and Wu, 2006; Hennessy 
and Whited, 2007). This ex-post approach is similar to the evaluative framework suggested in 
D’Espallier et al. (2008) and applied in Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009). The results 
show a persistent relation between the firm’s ICFS and its constraints-status with the R² 
adjusted suggesting that a significant proportion of variation in ICFS is driven by the 
existence of financing frictions. Conversely, for the CCFS we find no relation with any of the 
observable measures suggesting a much smaller link between the CCFS and the firm’s 
constraints-status.  
We believe that there are a number of interesting implications to this research. First, we hope 
to show that the firm’s investment policy is closely linked with its cash policy, suggesting the 
need to analyze the firm’s financial policies in combination with its real corporate policies 
rather than analyzing corporate decisions in isolation. In this respect our research fits into the 
literature trying to link different policies and investigate their combined impact on 
performance (Deshmukh and Vogt, 2005; Fisman and Love, 2003; Petersen and Rajan, 1994)  
Secondly, our research calls into question the recent shift in attention towards estimating 
cash-cash flow sensitivities in order to circumvent some of the methodological problems 
related to estimating investment-cash flow sensitivities (such as potential endogeneity of the 25 
 
cash flow variable or difficulty in controlling for investment opportunities in the underlying 
investment equation). It seems that the ICFS-metric performs better in terms of capturing 
financing constraints, even when the caveats of potential endogeneity and difficulty in 
controlling for investment opportunities are kept in mind. The negative relation between the 
two metrics alongside the better performance of the ICFS-measure suggests that the CCFS-
metric should be critically reviewed before it can be considered an adequate proxy to assess 
the degree in capital market imperfections. This conclusion is fully in line with the 
conclusions of Roddick and Whited (forthcoming) who argue that the firm’s cash policy is 
determined by income shocks and taxation issues, rather than by the cost of external funds. 
Our paper reaches a similar conclusion and provides new empirical evidence to this assertion. 
Finally, our research shows that the ex-post evaluative framework developed in D’Espallier et 
al. (2008) and Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009)  based upon firm-specific estimation is a 
considerable improvement over the traditional empirical framework in which sample-level 
estimates are compared against ex-ante classified groups. This paper is an attempt to draw 
upon this relatively new approach in order to shed new light on the established but still 
controversial ICFS-literature and the fairly novel CCFS-literature.   
Evidently, this research comes with a number of limitations that should be kept in mind. First, 
the empirical results are based upon a specific sample (1,233 U.S.-based listed manufacturing 
firms) and a specific time-frame (five year time period from 2000 until 2004). This relatively 
short time-frame was chosen in order to retain a large number of observations, while reducing 
the computational complexity involved in running the GME-estimator. Obviously our 
research might be subject to the specificities of the observed sample period and it would be 
interesting to see whether the results would hold under more general conditions.      26 
 
Secondly, this research is based upon a number of specific specifications for both the ICFS 
and CCFS-metric. The firm-level ICFS was estimated using a static augmented Q model of 
investment because this is clearly the specification most commonly applied in the literature. 
However, a number of recent studies experiment with different investment specifications such 
as dynamic neoclassical investment models (Bond et al., 2003; Guariglia, 2008), sales 
accelerator models (Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Hoshi et al., 1991) or specifications that take up 
different controls for the investment opportunities bias (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; 
Guariglia and Carpenter, 2008). It would be interesting to see whether the results hold for 
these alternative specifications that have been suggested in the previous literature.  
Finally, the ex-post evaluative framework is based upon a wide set of observables that have 
been shown to have a close link with the firm’s constraints-status. These observables are 
related to the firm’s liquidity position, debt position and profitability position and have a long-
standing tradition in the literature on financing constraints. However, there might be other 
observable measures of financing constraints that have not been used in this study or have 
been overlooked in the previous literature. Future research could be aimed at identifying other 
firm-observables related to the constraints-status of the firm and investigating the firm-level 
link with the ICFS and the CCFS.     
 
Appendix A. The GME-estimator 
The GME-estimator is a Quasi-Bayesian estimation technique based upon the principles of 
Information Theory. The estimator is developed and thoroughly discussed in the book by 
Golan et al. (1996). Applications of the GME-estimator to various fields in economics can be 
found in Judge and Golan (1992); Léon et al. (1999); Fraser (2000), Peeters (2004), among 27 
 
others. In this appendix we discuss the GME model formulation for the cash flow-augmented 
investment model given in equation (19) were Q is omitted for expository reasons. The GME 
formulation for the cash flow-augmented cash model is very similar and available from the 
authors upon request.  
Following Golan et al. (1996) the GME formulation of the classical linear regression model 
can be written as:  
 
max           ∑       
 
             ( A 1 )  
 
Subject to: 
                            (A2) 
∑   ,    1                   1,…   
             ( A 3 )  
∑   ,    1                   1,…   
             ( A 4 )  
 
were  p  is a          matrix of unknown probabilities that need to be estimated; Z  is a 
          matrix of discrete support values for   with  M the number of support points. 
Similarly, V is a          matrix of know support values for the error term e with J the 
number of support points and w the vector of unknown probabilities to be estimated.   
Equation (A1) represents the joint entropy of the parameters and the error term that need to be 
maximized with respect to p. Equation (A2) represents the data-consistency constraint which 
is the parametrical version of the regression model that needs to be estimated. In this equation, 
each parameter is written as a linear combination of discrete support values and unknown 28 
 
parameters. Equations (A3) and (A4) represent additivity-constraints or normalization 
constraints that ensure that for each parameter the estimated probabilities add up to one. 
According to Golan et al. (1996) working through this maximization problem yields 
parameter estimates  that are least-informative or expressing maximum uncertainty  ( i . e .  
closest to the discrete support values), while still consistent with the underlying model and the 
data.  
Applying this model formulation to the cash flow-augmented investment model yields: 
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In this constrained maximization problem (A5) is again the joint entropy of the parameters 
and the error term that needs to be maximized in order to obtain ‘least-informative’ parameter 
estimates closest to the support values. (A6) represents the data-consistency constraint which 
is the parametrical version of cash flow –augmented investment model where the unknown 
parameters are written as linear combinations of the unknown probabilities and discrete 29 
 
support values. Equation (A7) is a mean preservation constraint that ensures a consistent 
mean cash flow coefficient so that ‘shrinkage’ is avoided (Golan et al., 1996, pg. 163). 
Equation (A8) imposes a mean zero error in each year so that covariates and errors are 
determined exogenously. Equation (A9) represents the additivity-constraints that ensure that 
for each parameter to be estimated, the estimated probabilities add up to one.  
The posterior parameter estimates can be recovered by recombining the optimal probabilities 
and the discrete support values in a linear way as follows:  
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    ,        , 
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In line with the Bayesian research paradigm, the GME estimator combines both prior 
information and data in order to form a posterior parameter estimate. Following prior 
information sets were used: 
 
      0,1                ( A 1 3 )  
   ,      10,10             ( A 1 4 )  
   ,       3     /  , ,3    /  ,                ( A 1 5 )  
 
Equation (A13) expresses that the supports for the mean cash flow coefficient were chosen to 
be distributed symmetrically around 0.50. Equation (A14) expresses a wide support value for 30 
 
the shrinkage-parameter νi,t and (A15) expresses that the priors for the error term are bounded 
by three times the empirical standard deviation of the dependent variable, consistent with the 
‘three-sigma’ rule suggested in Pukelsheim (1994).  
For the Bayesian researcher, combining prior information with data is a natural way to 
enhance parameter estimates. However, for researchers not adhering to the Bayesian paradigm, 
an objection often raised is the sensitivity of the results to using different information sets. 
While it is true that the prior information plays a role in the estimation process, its effect 
should not be overstated. First, when samples are sufficiently large, the information contained 
in the data often overshadows the information content provided by the non-sample 
information (Lancaster, 2004). Secondly, with the prior information sets wide enough and 
containing the true value of the parameter, the researcher imposes a minimal restriction and 
maximizes the influence of the data on posterior estimates (Koop, 2003). Therefore, we do 
not expect the support values to have a large impact on the GME-estimates.   
However, in order to investigate the sensitivity of the estimates to the use of alternative prior 
information sets, we have conducted a sensitivity-analysis using the dual cross-entropy 
formulation in Golan et al. (1996). This procedure calculates the parameter estimates for 100 
different prior values drawn randomly out of a distribution of choice. Specifically, 100 spike 
priors for β were drawn from a uniform distribution U(-1,1), a uniform distribution (-10,10) 
and a normal distribution N(0.5,0.3). This exercise reveals that the results are extremely 
insensitive to the use of different prior sets, which was to be expected given the large number 
of data points and the wide intervals that were used. Results from this exercise are available 
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Table I. Summary statistics 
 
This table summarizes the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for a selection of 
financial variables from the sample of 6,165 firm-year observations. (I/K) is defined as investments in PP&E divided by 
beginning-of-year capital stock. (CF/K) is defined as net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization divided by beginning-of-year capital stock. Q is the beginning-of-year market value of common equity divided 
by beginning-of-year book value of common equity. Size is total assets in billion U.S.-dollar. Payout ratio is the sum of total 
dividends and stock repurchases divided by net income. Tangibility is PP&E divided by net fixed assets. Debt ratio is total 
debt divided by total assets. Cash/K is cash and equivalents divided by capital stock. Slack/K is (cash plus short term 
investments + 0.5 inventories+ 0.7 accounts receivables- short term loans) divided by capital stock. Sales is total net sales in 
billion U.S.-dollar. Sales growth is percentage growth in total net sales. Coverage is the interest coverage defined as EBIT 
divided by interest expenses and preferred dividends. Current ratio is current assets divided by current liabilities. ROE is 
return on equity defined as net income divided by beginning-of-year total common equity.       
 
 
Variable   #  obs   mean  median   st.  dev  min  max 
 
(I/K)   6,165   0.14  0.10   0.15  0.00  2.00 
(CF/K)   6,165   0.37  0.21   0.57  0.00  5.00 
Q   6,165   2.51  1.94   1.95  0.02  10 
Size   6,165   1.66  0.48   3.25  1.61  42.26   
Payout  ratio  6,090    0.02 0.00   0.07 0.00 0.97 
Tangibility  6,164    0.59 0.56   0.21 0.02 1.00  
Cash/K   6,085   0.38  0.11   0.71  0.00  3.83 
Slack/K   6,024   0.96  0.51   1.17  -1.69  4.50 
Debt  ratio  6,150    0.20 0.19   0.17 0.00 0.82 
Sales   6,165   1.81  0.51   3.99  0.01  65.05 
Sales  growth 6,165    0.12 0.09   0.09 -0.81  1.00 
Coverage  5,357   25.32  4.62   61.93  -7.00  300.00   
Current  ratio 6,006    2.69 2.03   2.63 0.22 47.56   





















Table II. Firm-varying sensitivities 
 
This table reports a number of statistics for the for the 1,233 firm-varying ICFS-estimates and CCFS-estimates from the 
GME-estimation process in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. P(x) represents the x
th percentile. The figures represent the 
kernel-density functions of the distribution of firm-varying ICFS and CCFS. 
        
Panel A. ICFS-estimates   βi, ICFS 
mean     0.30 
st.dev.     0.08   
minimum    -0.34   
maximum    1.10     
 
P(0.01)     0.06 
P(0.05)     0.17 
P(0.10)     0.22 
P(0.30)     0.29 
median     0.31 
P(0.60)     0.32 
P(0.70)     0.32 
P(0.90)     0.35 
P(0.95)     0.40 
P(0.99)     0.56 
 
Proportion < 0      0.5% 
Proportion in [0, 0.50[    97.8%   
 
Mean lower 30% tail    0.23 
Mean middle 40% area    0.30 
Mean upper 30% tail    0.37 
        
Panel B. CCFS-estimates  βi, CCFS 
mean     0.11 
st.dev.     0.16   
minimum    -0.57   
maximum    1.64     
 
P(0.01)     -0.40 
P(0.05)     -0.16 
P(0.10)     0.00 
P(0.30)     0.09 
median     0.11 
P(0.60)     0.11 
P(0.70)     0.12 
P(0.90)     0.29 
P(0.95)     0.32 
P(0.99)     0.66 
 
Proportion in [0, 0.50[    97.8%   
Proportion in [0.50, 1]    1.94% 
 
Mean lower 30% tail    -0.006 
Mean middle 40% area    0.10 




Table III. Negative relation between ICFS and CCFS 
 
Panel A reports a number of summary statistics for the CCFS in a number of discrete classes with different ICFS-values. The 
different classes correspond to the 4 quartiles in the ICFS-distribution. Panel B analyzes the correlation between ICFS and 
CCFS directly by reporting the covariance and Pearson’s correlation between the two metrics.  
 
 
Panel A. CCFS in discrete ICFS-classes 
    Very low ICFS    Low ICFS    High ICFS    Very high ICFS 
  ICFS<  P25%   P 25%<ICFS<P50%   P50%<ICFS<P75%   ICFS>P75% 
  ICFS  <  0.28   0.28<ICFS<0.30   0.30<ICFS<0.32   ICFS>0.32 
 
Mean   0.127    0.116    0.109    0.0711 
Low     -1.52    -0.78    -0.33    -0.97 
High   1.33    1.64    0.69    0.75 




Panel B. correlation between ICFS and CCFS 
 
Covariance     -0.0011     
Pearson’s correlation  -0.083*** 
Spearman’s rho    -0.115*** 
Kendall’s tau    -0.085*** 

































Table IV. Observables related to financing constraints 
 
This table summarizes the financial variables that have been used in the ex-post regression analysis (column 1) and their 
definition (column 2). In the third column we indicate the expected relation with the sensitivity in the ex-post regression 
analysis. All variables are defined as in Table I.  
 
Financial observables    variables definition    Expected coefficient sign  
If the sensitivity is a positive indicator of 
financing constraints we expect following 
sign in the ex-post regression analysis: 
Dividend  payout    Payout  ratio        - 
Leverage   Debt  ratio     + 
Growth     Sales  growth     - 
Size     Natural    logarithm  of  total  assets   - 
    Natural  logarithm  of  sales    - 
C a s h      C a s h   r a t i o        -  
    C F / K       -    
Profitability    ROE      - 


































Table V. Ex-post regression analysis 
 
This table summarizes the results from regressing the firm-level sensitivities on a number of observable measures related to the constraints-status of the firm using OLS. Panel A presents the 
regression output for the ICFS-metric and Panel B presents the regression output for the CCFS-metric. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. The different columns correspond to alternative definitions that were taken up subsequently for the same financial observable 
(size is measured both in sales as well as lnTA; profitability is measured both in terms of ROE and interest coverage; cash is measured in terms of the cash rate as well as cash flow ).  
 
Panel A. Regressing the ICFS on the observable measures 
Dep. var. ICFSi    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)    
Payout  ratio    -0.07   -0.02   -0.06   -0.04   -0.07   -0.05 
    (0.046)*   (0.022)*   (0.051)*** (0.035)*** (0.045)*** (0.014)*** 
Debt  ratio    0.10   0.12   0.11   0.10   0.10   0.11 
    (0.025)***  (0.024)***  (0.025)***  (0.023)***  (0.025)***  (0.022)*** 
Sales  growth    -0.03   -0.03   -0.04   -0.01   -0.03   -0.01 
    (0.041)   (0.038)   (0.041)   (0.039)   (0.041)   (0.037) 
Interest  coverage    -0.07     -0.07   -0.06   -0.07    
    (0.028)**    (0.028)**  (0.029)**  (0.029)** 
R O E        - 0 . 0 1          - 0 . 0 1  
      ( 0 . 0 0 1 ) * * *         ( 0 . 0 0 2 ) * *  
LnTA     -0.004   -0.004     -0.003   -0.005    
    (0.002)***  (0.001)***    (0.001)**  (0.002)*** 
l n S a l e s            - 0 . 0 1        - 0 . 0 1  
        ( 0 . 0 0 2 ) * * *       ( 0 . 0 0 1 ) * * *  
C a s h / K      - 0 . 0 2    - 0 . 0 2    - 0 . 0 2      - 0 . 0 2  
    (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***    (0.004)*** 
C F / K            - 0 . 1 0      - 0 . 0 9  
          (0.009)***    (0.008)*** 
C C F S              - 0 . 0 2    - 0 . 0 1  
            ( 0 . 0 1 8 ) *    ( 0 . 0 1 5 ) *  
Constant   0.33   0.36   0.33   0.36   0.36   0.33 
    (0.009)***  (0.012)***  (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.010)*** 
N     1219   1211   1109   1117   1109   1219 
F-stat        34.21*** 19.07*** 14.42*** 23.34*** 13.21*** 31.59*** 
R²  adj.     0.39   0.36   0.33   0.37   0.32   0.39 






Table V. continued 
 
Dep. var. CCFSi    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)    
Payout  ratio    -0.03   -0.02   -0.03   0.00   -0.03   -0.05 
    (0.074)   (0.021)   (0.074)   (0.075)   (0.073)   (0.020)* 
Debt  ratio    -0.04   -0.03   -0.04   -0.05   -0.04   -0.04 
    (0.028)   (0.028)   (0.027)   (0.029)*   (0.029)   (0.029)   
Sales  growth    0.07   0.13   0.06   0.07   0.07   0.14 
    (0.058)   (0.062)   (0.058)   (0.058)   (0.058)   (0.062)** 
Interest  coverage    -0.01     -0.01   -0.01   -0.02    
    (0.103)     (0.103)*   (0.101)*   (0.104)* 
R O E        0 . 0 0          0 . 0 0  
      ( 0 . 0 0 3 )          ( 0 . 0 0 0 )  
LnTA     0.00   0.00     0.00   0.00    
    (0.002)   (0.003)     (0.002)   (0.002) 
l n S a l e s            0 . 0 0        0 . 0 0  
        ( 0 . 0 0 2 )        ( 0 . 0 0 2 )    
Cash/K     0.00   0.01   0.00     0.00 
    (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.007)     (0.006)   
C F / K            - 0 . 0 2      - 0 . 0 1  
          (0.017)     (0.017) 
I C F S              - 0 . 0 2    - 0 . 0 4  
            ( 0 . 0 4 6 ) *    ( 0 . 0 5 1 ) * *  
Constant   0.14   0.14   0.14   0.15   0.15   0.17 
    (0.019)***  (0.019)***  (0.015)*** (0.019)*** (0.024)*** (0.019)*** 
N     1109   1211   1109   1117   1109   1219 
F-stat     1.66   2.37   4.18**   4.12***   4.38***   5.74*** 
R²  adj.     0.06   0.05   0.06   0.06   0.06   0.05 
RMSE     0.15   0.15   0.14   0.14   0.14   0.15 
 